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REPLY TO STEPHEN WHITE
hilary putnaM
When i responded to stephen White’s deep and elegant lecture in rome, i said that i agreed with his transcendental argument and i do. it is a profound contribu-
tion to the discussion of the epistemology and phenomenology of perception. and apart 
from one minor textual issue having to do with William James,1 was so convinced by that 
lecture that i had no criticism to voice. But on a subsequent close reading of his paper, i 
have discovered an issue (one that he raises towards the end) where it seems that we do 
disagree, and it seems appropriate to explain that disagreement in this reply, although i 
don’t want the fact that we disagree on a very subtle and complex issue to obscure the 
fact that i do find the central argument of his paper an important contribution.
The subtle issue in question has to do with supervenience. White sets up a complicated 
pair of examples. “in the first example,” White tells us, “one is in perceptual contact 
with the external world in the usual way.  one has, however, a duplicate in a virtual 
reality setup whose brain is molecule-for-molecule identical to one’s own and is receiv-
ing the same electrical inputs.  suppose that in the duplicate’s case the inputs are all 
completely artificial, and the duplicate is out of touch with the external world.  in the 
second example, the source of the electrical inputs to one’s own brain switches back 
and forth (seamlessly) between the real world and an artificial source.  suppose it does 
so in such a way that one has no idea that such switches are taking place.  and suppose 
that when one is told about the switches, one has no idea when or how often they oc-
cur.” and he continues:
considerations stemming from frege’s constraint (together with the requirement 
that we say how it is satisfied in particular cases) suggest that we should opt for 
supervenience on what is intrinsic to the brain.  The desire to do justice to the 
phenomenological fact that there is something it is like to have the experience 
one is having now—something shared by one’s duplicate and the person-stages 
of oneself that are out of touch with the world—seems to point in the same 
1 in my book, The Threefold Cord, i said that Willam James showed that there is no good argument for the inter-
face conception, and this statement is challenged in White’s paper. i stand by it for the following reason: far from 
overlooking what White calls “modes of presentation” (in the case of direct perception), James recognizes them, 
and defends the radical claim that these are aspects of the perceived public object.  (This  may make him the first 
“disjunctivist”.) There is a sense in which James convinced russell, because russell says in The Analysis of Mind that 
he has been won over by “the american new realists whose leader was William James”. ironically, the american 
new realists never admitted that they took their realism from William James. But, russell knew very well where 
they got it.
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direction.  and yet if the arguments above are roughly correct, doing so can only 
be self-defeating.  however, the nonsupervenience of our conscious experiences 
on the intrinsic features of events in the brain, together with their supervenience 
on the physical threatens to make facts about what it is like to have one’s present 
experiences mysterious.  and the nonsupervenience of such facts on the totality 
of physical objects, facts, and events makes it mysterious how we could ever get 
in touch with mental events.  Thus it leads to apparently intractable problems 
with self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds—problems that generate 
their own versions of meaning skepticism.
“having, in this way, encountered what looks like an antinomy—since all the alter-
natives (global supervenience, supervenience on brain-states, and denial of superve-
nience) supposedly have objectionable consequences—“ White opts for saying that 
“this problem of supervenience cannot arise”. “Very briefly,” he continues, “the agential 
perspective and the objective-causal perspective are, on my view, incommensurable in 
the Kuhnian/hansonian sense.”
i do not, however, find the antinomy genuine.2  While it would take a book to explain 
in full why i think it isn’t,3 i hope that i can briefly indicate the main points at which i 
disagree with this argument:
first, i do think that all of our capacities, including “agential” ones (a category which, 
as stephen White correctly argues, includes our perceptual capacities), supervene on 
the states of the physical universe, including, in a great many cases, past as well as 
present ones. stephen White scorns “naturalism”, but that, i think, is because he iden-
tifies “naturalism” with reductive naturalism (a mistake i have been guilty of making 
at times myself). When i am careful, i say that i am a naturalist—a non-reductive 
naturalist—and i don’t see how any naturalist can deny global supervenience of hu-
man psychological states and capacities.4  (and appealing to the murky doctrine of 
“incomensurability” is no help.) But there is no one simple answer to the question 
of whether our agential capacities are locally supervenient (supervenient on just the 
relevant brain-states) or globally supervenient (supervenient on factors external to the 
brain, and even to the organism), because it depends on which agential capacities one is 
talking about, even if we restrict the issue to perceptual capacities. 
to see what i mean, let me mention a bit of science fiction of my own—a variant of 
ned Block’s idea of “inverted Earth”.  in Block’s scenario,5 the sky on inverted Earth 
2 By the way, i have always found the Kuhnian notion of incommensurability seriously confused.
3 hilla Jacobson  and i are engaged in writing a book on perception which will discuss these, among other, top-
ics.
4 There are, however, misuses of the notion of supervenience, particularly by reductionist philosophers. on this 
see, my “The uniqueness of pragmatism”, Think, autumn, 2004, pp. 89-205.
5 Block, ned, 1990: “inverted Earth”, in James tomberlin (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives, 4, Action Theory and 
Philosophy of Mind, atascadero, ridgeview,  53-79.
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was supposed to be yellow, the grass was supposed to be red, etc. But to an immi-
grant who has been provided with color-inverting lenses (and whose body pigments 
are changed) everything would seem as it does on earth, although, unknown to the 
immigrant (who was brought to inverted Earth as a small child) his neighbors have 
visual “qualia” which are the opposite of his.  in my version (constructed for a seminar 
on perception that i taught recently), there is no immigrant and the natives of inverted 
Earth have naturally evolved neural systems  that act like color-inverting lenses. in this 
version, the sky looks to inverted Earthers the very same way our sky looks to us, but 
it is “really” yellow, etc., and the “correction” to the sky’s color (by the visual system 
of the inverted Earthers) is the result of the evolution of their visual system, not the 
insertion of anything artificial.  The purpose of my thought-experiment was to make it 
clear that the same quale (the one we call the sensation of blue) could have the biologi-
cal function of representing the presence of a quite different color.
now, in order to discuss White’s problem about supervenience, i want to use a combi-
nation of the two scenarios. let Jim, who is one of us “Earthers”, be transported to in-
verted Earth, but without being aware of the differences. and suppose Jim to be fitted 
with clever contact lenses that switch colors with their complementary colors (without 
his being aware that this has been done), so that the colors of objects on inverted Earth 
look “normal” to him. it is dark and rainy for several hours, and then the sun comes 
out, and Jim’s inverted Earther friend Betty says, “look at that blue sky!”, and Jim re-
sponds enthusiastically, “yes, it’s a heavenly blue”. since Jim is speaking Earth English 
and Betty is speaking inverted Earth English,6 Jim is actually wrong (the sky is yellow, 
not blue) and in agreeing with Betty, he is agreeing to an incompatible description of 
the sky, since Betty means that the sky is yellow—at least yellow (i am, of course, us-
ing Earth language here) is the color it is the function of the inverted Earth-English 
word “blue” to pick out. By frege’s constraint, there must be a relevant difference in the 
mode of presentation of the sky to Jim and to Betty, to account for the fact that Jim, 
without being mentally disturbed, etc., has just accepted two incompatible statements 
about the color of the sky. and there is: Jim is seeing the sky through color-switching 
lenses. But this is not a difference in the brain-states  of Jim and Betty (as far as their 
visual systems are concerned). so in this case, frege’s constraint should lead us to say 
that the mode of presentation of the color of the sky is supervenient on the brain-state 
plus something external to the brain: the presence of contact lenses, in Jim’s case. if the 
mode of presentation depended only on the state of the visual cortex, it would be the 
same for Betty as for Jim, and the acceptance (unawares) of incompatible beliefs by Jim 
would not have a fregean explanation.
6 The only difference between the two languages is that in Earth English the word “blue” refers to the color blue, 
and in twin Earth English it refers to yellow. But neither Jim nor Betty know this, and the phenomenal character 
of Betty’s experiences of what she calls “blue” , i.e., her experiences of yellow things, such as the inverted Earth sky, 
matches the phenomenal character of Jim’s experiences of what he calls “blue”, such as his experiences of the Earth 
sky, prior to his visual system’s being altered.
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i believe, however, that both Betty and Jim are capable of introspecting the visual qual-
ity of their sensation (which is the same) when they look at the sky. in this case, the 
mode of presentation is the same, and it may well be that it is only “locally” superve-
nient. But in the case of a presentation of a public property or a public object, i do not 
see frege’s constraint as driving us to reject global supervenience at all. 
armed with these observations, let me return to stephen White’s thought-experi-
ments. We recall that White wrote: “considerations stemming from frege’s constraint 
(together with the requirement that we say how it is satisfied in particular cases) sug-
gest that we should opt for supervenience on what is intrinsic to the brain.  The desire 
to do justice to the phenomenological fact that there is something it is like to have the 
experience one is having now—something shared by one’s duplicate and the person-
stages of oneself that are out of touch with the world—seems to point in the same 
direction.  and yet if the arguments above are roughly correct, doing so can only be 
self-defeating.” My response is that phenomenal character (“what it’s like”) is, indeed, 
supervenient on “what is intrinsic to the brain”, but that what we are aware of, and that 
in many cases includes “modes of presentation”, is usually not. That what we are aware 
of is a function of our “quale” is the essential tenet of classical empiricism, but that 
tenet is, i believe quite wrong. (and countering that error by denying the existence 
of qualia altogether is also wrong.) awareness of public objects and properties (e.g., 
Betty’s and Jim’s awareness of the color of their respective skies, when they are on their 
respective home planets) is mediated by object involving capacities. Those capacities 
are functional states in a non-reductive sense of “functional states”, and they have long 
arms; they reach out to the world. They are not locally supervenient.
But what of White’s unhappy subject, who is such that the electrical impulses to her 
brain switch back and forth (seamlessly) between the real world and an artificial 
source? “suppose it does so in such a way that [she] has no idea that such switches 
are taking place.  and suppose that when [she] is told about the switches, [she] has 
no idea when or how often they occur.” Well, imagine a subject who is teleported back 
and forth (seamlessly) between Earth and inverted Earth, from babyhood on. What is 
the extension of her predicate “blue”? Does she speak Earth English or inverted Earth 
English? it seems obvious that there is no fact of the matter in this case. But it does 
not follow that there is no fact of the matter in the case of a subject normally brought 
up in a definite language community. frege’s constraint should not be interpreted as a 
guarantee that what cavell famously called “the truth, or what i might call the moral 
of skepticism”7 can be refuted. and if it isn’t so interpreted, i see no difficulty here for 
global skepticism or non-reductive naturalism.
7 stanley cavell, The Claim of Reason, clarendon press, oxford 1979, p. 241.
